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Research Capabilities
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UAS-NAS integration 
concepts
ACES: Flight plan and NAS-agent 
modeling systemTraffic displays, DAA algorithms, ATC, Ground Control Station
Human-in-the-Loop and Flight Test Evaluation
NAS-wide Simulation
17 UAS types
UAS models,
comm. link models18 UAS mission profiles DAA algorithms
New UAS-related modeling and simulation capabilities
DAA sensor models
Airspace Separation Mitigation for UAS
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• The lack of an onboard pilot leads to the problem of how to deal with the legal 
requirement identified in the US Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) that pilots “see and 
avoid” other aircraft (specifically 14 CFR 91.113)
Sense and Avoid (SAA) was defined by the FAA sponsored SAA for UAS Workshop Final Report 
published in October 9, 2009 as “the combination of UAS Self-Separation (SS) plus Collision 
Avoidance (CA) as a means of compliance with 14CFR Part 91, §91.111 and §91.113”
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(Detect and Avoid)
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Key Measure of Safety: Risk Ratio
• Risk Ratio
– The net improvement in safety arising from a given mitigation
– Risk Ratio is an experimental measure of projected performance
– Risk Ratio was used in TCAS II safety analysis
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Mid air collision rate with self separation
Mid air collision rate without self separation
Collision
Avoidance
Self-Separation
0 sec ….…….…35 sec…….……….~2 min
Sense and Avoid
(Detect and Avoid)
Risk Ratio for Self Separation   = 
Concept of Loss of Well Clear
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• A well clear separation standard should be large enough to
– Avoid collision avoidance maneuvers by intruders, 
– Minimize traffic alert issuances by air traffic control,
– Avoid excessive concern for pilots of proximate piloted aircraft.
• Time and distance-based definition of “Loss of Well Clear (LoWC)”  
– When two aircraft are within distance thresholds
– When the projected horizontal closest point of approach (CPA) of two aircraft is within 
a distance-based volume in particular time thresholds 
Vertical
Criteria
Horizontal criteria
“Well Clear” Distance Thresholds
Modified Tau
“Well Clear” Time Thresholds
Horizontal criteria
Definition of Loss of Well Clear
Parameters Values Descriptions
Modified Tau 35 sec Ratio of range to range rate with DMOD
DMOD 4,000 ft Distance modification that represents a minimum 
desirable range between two aircraft
HMD 4,000 ft Horizontal distance at the predicted horizontal CPA
ZTHR 450 ft Current altitude separation
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ZTHR
DMOD
Modified Tau
HMD
Self-Separation Alerting
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• Self-Separation Threshold (SST): Time to predicted LoWC
Predicted 
Trajectory
SS Alert
Estimated Time to LoWC <= SST
.  
 . 
 .
Predicted 
LoWC
{Rxy (tcpa ) ≤ HMDand 0 ≤ τmod ≤ τ *mod}
Δh < ZTHR
ownship
intruder
Fast-Time Simulation Environment
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Modeling and Simulation: ACES
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4-DOF Trajectory Model
Aerodynamic models of aircraft 
Models replicate pilot behavior
User-definable uncertainty characteristics
NAS-wide Simulation
• Gate-to-gate simulation of 
ATM operations  
• Full flight schedule with 
flight plans
• Sector and center models 
with some airspace 
procedures
Simulation Agents
• Air traffic controller decision making
• Traffic flow management models
• Individual aircraft characteristics
• UAS Detect-and-Avoid (DAA) System 
[JADEM] 
National Traffic Management Regional Traffic Management
Local Approach 
and Departure 
Traffic 
Management
Airport and Surface 
Traffic Management
UAS Missions Overview
• Developed under contract with IAI Inc.
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UAS$Mission Total$Number$
of$Flights
Total$Flight$
Time$(hr)
1 Aerial$Imaging$and$Mapping 295 182.60
2 Air$Qualtiy$Monitoring 1044 2393.49
3 OnJDemand$Air$Taxi$Cirrus 8720 6240.12
4 OnJDemand$Air$Taxi$Mustang 3180 1107.76
5 Airborne$Pathogen$Tracking 1308 3002.24
6 Border$Patrol 867 3357.90
7 Cargo$Delivery 1317 1966.07
8 Flood$Inund.$Mapping 127 275.02
9 Flood$Stream$Flow 200 368.51
10 Law$Enforcement 300 859.11
11 Maritime$Patrol 1512 11267.74
12 Point$Source$Emission$Monitoring 432 648.05
13 Spill$Monitoring 836 2078.07
14 Strategic$Fire$Monitoring 312 4959.85
15 Tactical$Fire$Monitoring 2496 3373.88
16 Traffic$Monitoring 1043 1953.05
17 Weather$Data$Collection 2401 13324.86
18 Wildlife$Monitoring 308 189.34
Total 26698 57547.66
Mission Characteristics
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UAS group Duration 
(per flight)
Flights per day Cruise Alt. Flight Pattern
Air Quality Monitoring Shadow-B 1-4 hrs. 104-1044 4k,5k, and 6k  
ft AGL
Radiator Grid Pattern
Cargo Transport Cessna 208 varies 1.4k 2k-16k Point to Point
Atmospheric Sampling Global Hawk 1.5-13 hrs. 2352 5k-35k ft AGL Radiator Grid Pattern
On-demand Remote Air 
Taxi -Cirrus
Cirrus SR22T varies 8k 6k-11k Point to Point
On-demand Remote Air 
Taxi - Mustang
Cessna 
Mustang
varies 2k-4k 9k-20k Point to Point
Strategic  Fire Monitoring Predator-B 20 hrs. 74-324 31k ft MSL Radiator Grid Pattern
Tactical Fire Monitoring Shadow-B 1-1.5 hrs. varies varies Circular Loitering Orbit
Flood Inundation Mapping Aerosonde 1-4 hrs. varies 4k ft AGL Radiator Grid Pattern
Point to Point
Flow Stream Monitoring Aerosonde 1-4 hrs. 20-200 4k Radiator Grid Pattern
Point to Point
NAS-wide UAS Mission Profile
• A snapshot of mission profiles: UAS tracks in blue
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VFR Traffic (courtesy of 84th RADES)
• The 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron (RADES) data were used.
– The data contain the radar hits collected from hundreds of radar sites in U.S, and 
each hit provide timestamp, latitude, longitude and others but does not always 
provide Mode 3 code, Mode C code.
– There is no explicit information that could be used to determine whether radar 
hits come from IFR flights or VFR flights.
– All cooperative VFR has the same Mode 3 code, 1200.
– A single aircraft could be detected from multiple radar sites.
• Cooperative VFR tracks were processed using
– A clustering method based on a modified minimum spanning tree algorithm,
– The quadratic regression to estimate the aircraft position within a time window,
– A Kalman filter to generate smooth trajectories,
– Filters to categorize each track into IFR or VFR: altitude, speed, and Mode 3 code.
• Non-cooperative VFR tracks were processed
– Using algorithm developed by Honeywell to process non-cooperative VFR tracks 
and estimates altitude measurements
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Processed VFR Traffic: Geographic Flight Density 
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* Cooperative VFR Flight Profiles from April 4th, 2012
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VFR Traffic: Geographic Flight Density – Video Clip
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VFR Traffic: Density by Altitude
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Altitude [ft]
UTC Time [hours]
Number of VFR 
flights flying 
simultaneously 
within 100 ft
block
* Cooperative VFR Flight Profiles from April 4th, 2012
Track Evaluation
Evaluate/Prioritize/Declare
Surveillance System
Detect and Track
DAA Model
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Onboard Radar
Maneuver Guidance
Determine
Threat 
Evaluator
Alerting 
Algorithm
Fused/Inte
grated 
Track Alert
Resolution
Active Mode-C/S 
Transponder
ADS-B In
Intruders
Command
UAS 
Operator 
Model
Avoidance 
Algorithm
original path
new path 
with maneuver
• JAVA architecture (JADEM)
A Stochastic Pilot Response Model
• Pilot total response time is the time from the first self-separation alert to the time 
pilot uploads maneuver to prevent loss of well clear.
– NASA HSI team breaks this down by different measures
• Use total pilot response time data from IHITL to build a pilot response time model, 
so there are realistic responses to SS alerts in ACES simulations
– Sample for a distribution, and “wait” that amount of time before commanding 
maneuver
18
Distributions fit to 
IHITL Results
Perceive a new Self 
Separation Alert
Evaluate Remaining 
Time to LoWC
(Urgency)
Determine Pilot 
Response Delay
High Urgency
Mid Urgency
Low Urgency
Accomplished ACES Simulation Studies and 
On-going Studies
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Accomplished ACES Fast-Time Simulation Studies
• DAA Surveillance Performance Study
– To evaluate potential safety by investigating geometric characteristics of intruders that 
caused LoWC
– To propose and investigate performance metrics for evaluating the performance of 
surveillance system, such as the ratio of undetected and late-detected LoWC, and the 
time to LoWC at first detection for given surveillance parameters
• Encounter Rate Simulation Study
– To evaluate the effect of LoWC parameters on LoWC rates by measuring the LoWC rates 
per UAS flight hour as a function of time or distance thresholds
– To characterize encounters at the LoWC boundary and evaluate the alerting threshold 
definition that includes Time to CPA, horizontal and vertical miss distance 
• Airspace Safety Threshold Study
– To determine encounter rates based on historical radar data
– To determine encounter rates based on simulated UAS missions with/without ATC 
separation provision services
* All accomplished studies were unmitigated studies in which no UAS or VFR flights were maneuvered 
to avoid potential Loss of Well Clear.
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Encounter Characteristics of Intruders at LoWCs
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• Relative position, Bearing distribution, and Horizontal Closure Rate
à Heading Direction (nmi)
Lateral
Direction
(nmi)
100 Knots
DMOD circle 
Type of Loss of Well Clear
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On-going ACES Fast-Time Simulation Studies
• DAA Alert and Resolution Performance Study
– To investigate the effects of different SST setting on the DAA SS system 
performance by measuring metrics such as correct/nuisance/late/missed alerts, 
time to LoWC at first alerts, alerting duration, and resolution success rates
– To analyze the effect of a distance buffer on the definition of LoWC
– To investigate the number of concurrent intruders detected within a surveillance 
volume during the flight and at alerts
• PT5 Encounter Threshold Study
– To calculate the frequency of PT5 alerts levels and investigate encounter 
characteristics at alerts (e.g. range, relative speed, relative heading, and vertical 
closure rate)
– To analyze the sequence and duration of PT5 alert levels during an encounter and 
the underlying causes of transitions between alert levels (e.g., by analyzing the 
conflict geometries)
– To calculate the risk ratio that the PT5 alerting scheme can provide
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Sample Result 1: Loss of Well Clear on CONUS
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• Simulating UAS missions without DAA systems and ATC separation provision 
services on cooperative VFR traffic on April 4, 2012,
– The UAS missions (26,698 flights, 57,547 total flight hrs) cause 2,664 Loss of Well Clears.
– LoWCs occurred mostly in the regions that have high VFR density.
Sample Result 2: Distribution of Relative Range at SS Alerts
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• Relative range distribution when SS alerts were issued
– Self-Separation Threshold: Time to estimated LoWC
– For three Self-Separation Threshold: 45 sec, 60 sec, and 75 sec
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Summary
• ACES is used to simulate NAS-wide operations of UAS and VFR flights
– UAS missions and background VFR traffic
– JADEM, a Java architecture for DAA model
– Pilot response model
• Fast-time simulation studies have been accomplished
– Airborne encounter characteristics, preliminary surveillance performance, and 
airspace safety have been investigated and follow-on studies are in progress
– The simulation results help RTCA SC-228 to develop minimum operational 
performance standard (MOPS) for DAA systems
• Future ACES fast-time simulation studies
– DAA surveillance performance study with high-fidelity sensor model
– Risk ratio study
– And more…
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Questions?
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Contact Information
Chunki Park
chunki.park@nasa.gov
